Six years later, a modest effort by the Bush Administration to at least symbolicly ressurect America's mid east role as broker for a peace settlement may not eviscerate a tenure of quixotic and disastrous mid east policies openly hostile to peace negotiations, but at least it symbolicly moves the US incrementally toward our traditional position. Most notable among the slight re-emergence of our permanent regional interests is our inclusion (much to the chagrin of Cheney and his neo-con fanatic Administration allies) of Syria in the peace talks. While little is expected in the way of territorial results in Annapolis, positive symbolism can garner much US credibility in the region.
Subsequent to the US invasion of Iraq, The Bush Administration radically altered US policy toward Syria away from the entente cordial that had served both countries very well, to a visceral hostility designed by hardline neo-cons in Washington who have long resented Syria's role as, strategic counter force to Israel. Apparantly it was unforgivable that Syria, which earned kudos form US policymakers as an earnest US ally in the post 9/11 war on Al Quaeda terror, had not supported our invasion in neighboring Iraq. The young Syrian President actually had the audacity to warn America that while defeating Sadaam would be easy, controlling that fractious country and its simmering sectarian conflict would be a bedeviling task. The mistake of being right has rarely been so painful.
Asaad's knowledge of his region was obviously superior to Bush's neocon aides who assured him that once Sadaam (a true tyrant) was removed, all would be well and the Iraqis would fully embrace our presence and our plans for their country. Yet the President continued to be largely guyided by these forces, including his own VP, and both our regional credibility and our military have been ill served by this manipulation of US foreign policy.
Our policy had been so distorted in recent years that we were actively opposing Syria/Israeli peace talks for the last few years when Syria eagerly pursued the same. Now, belatedly and with ambivilance, Secretary Rice prevailed over Cheney's zealots and we extended an invitation to Syria for the Annapolis talks. Yet the hangover from recent years will not fade easily and some have been designing new punishments for Syria if it is to be seriously allowed to negotiate a settlement with Israel. It actually has become trendy for some Syrophobes to suggest that it should be inveterate in any progress on the Golan front for Syria to abandon its interests and its history in Lebanon. This is an insidious formula that is being put forward as almost self - evident in the hopes that such a radical new paradigm will be percieved as a long-standing assumption in the region, and hence a standard by which to judge Syria' s worthiness to enter peace talks with Israel. Not only is the aforementioned a false paradigm that would have been previously viewed as laughable, but it is directly contravened by what emerged as a comprehensive consensus between all relevant parties during peacetalks in the 90s.
When Syria and Israel were engaged in US sponsored, meaningful peace negotiations, no less than Israel
itself (with the strong support of the US) enumerated its recognition of Syria's special role in Lebanon. This Israeli recognition (which the US accepted years before) occurred for two fundemental reasons, and one tertiary reason.
1) The position's clear and unequivocal historic legitimacy
2) The position's significant definitive strategic benefits to all regional parties and the US
1b) Largely due to reason #1, people in Lebanon (of all sects) understood and accepted Syria's special role
That said, official recognition of this self evident truth also served to facilitate mid east peace, and hence
would be an immeasurably vital gift to all the peoples of the war weary region. It certainly brought intra-Lebanese peace and economic reconstruction to a war ravaged population, without replacing that country's institutions. Of course, the Israeli recognition of Syria's special and unique role in Lebanon was never tethered to a final agreement between Israel and Syria on Golan issues; nor should it be today.
There are ebbs and flows in geopolitics, especially in the middle east. But while current trends must by
neccesity be considered by states, and even compromised with to varying degrees, it cannot be a
substitute for interests that are permanent. This aphorism is even more incontravertible for weaker
states such as Syria. Reasonable compromise may be strategically viable (talking peace with Israel was and is a worthy concession from past policies), but capitualtion on the Lebanese issue will only bring derision, scorn and irrellevance upon a Syria with little else left in its quiver. In the end, it behooves the US and Israel to have strong and secure arab partners which are held to greater accountabality
It has been border line hysterical that the French (who are at the root cause of much of this problem) and my President’s people have consistently been IN Beirut cajoling and directing Lebanese leaders as they denounce “foreign interference”. Lebanon will always be heavily influenced by other nations, as it always has been; and those who now complain the loudest against "foreign intereference" (even as they simultaneously and incessantly meet with foreign officials) are the ones who through the decades have most aggressively solicited and embraced foreign interference for their own benefit.
Syria has sought a peace with Israel that comports with UN resolutions. Most importantly, it desires to ressurect the de-facto alliance with America which served the peace and stability of the region. When back in the good graces of America, it will no doubt become even more effective in continuing to fight destabilizing, terroristic forces such as Al Quaeda alongside us. Inbedded in its civic discourse and education is an extremely high value on religous moderation and tolerance; in an era when the lack of both has cost so much destruction. These virtues, more vital than ever in this post 9/11 wold, will be enhanced by a return to the US/ Syrian concordat. Also, it also is the only regional player that has had good, working relations with all three of the major communities in Iraq.
Obstinate, neo-con directed policies in support of unworthy allies that do not serve traditional US objectives have had a debilitating affect on our efforts and objectives in the region. Syria wants and needs to be a prominent player in a Lebanon that was severed from it by postwar I French Colonialists, and used as threat against it at certain points. Our interests in Lebanon are stability, a controlled border with Israel, and peace for its people; not the reinstatement of political power to certain sectarian warlords. Syria can again be a force of stability there and be held accountable by us on the broader objectives that serve our interests. There is a wide swath of middle ground between complete Syrian dominance and the capitualtion that the neo-cons and their March 14 allies have prescribed. Specifically, a return to this natural state does not require Syrian batallions!
The recent past, due to a strong shift in American policy, has weakened Syria's regional position, but
while injured, Syria has resisted the temptation and coercion directed at it to abandon its permanent
interests, and has proven itself not only quite resiliant but also too the dismay of its political
foes, still very relevant. If Syria now relents and allows itself to be marginilized in the Lebanon, the
exmplification of a Syrian permanent interest, for benefits real or imagined in another front, it will
most assuredely do so at its own peril. I do not believe it will succumb. Its position in Lebanon is the sina qua non of Syrian strategic and cultural issues, it is inveterate to Syria's history and self identity.
It was, AND IS in US interest to have Syria in a position of power and accountablity in Lebanon. My country needs to return to realist and self serving policies, and returning to an entente cordial with Syria is a vital part of that equation. It served us well before, and it will do so again.